

Exploring the Feasibility of More Humanistic Approaches in Management Thought and Practice through Ubuntu

Abstract

We explore the possibility of infusing management thought with the humanistic philosophies as of indigenous cultures, such as Ubuntu. Using the philosophy of science taxonomy, we demonstrate that social sciences thought have been misguided by the uncritical adoption of the rational logics of the natural sciences. We propose a hybrid paradigm consisting of rationality and compassion, deliberate on its practical significance, and suggest that management theory and practice will be enriched by infusion of more humanistic approaches reflected in Ubuntu. The implications of drawing on the socio-economic paradigm for managing diverse, cross-cultural organizations operating in a global environment are discussed.

Introduction

Over the years researchers and practitioners have questioned the sustainability of organizations, which are managed scientifically, as heartless, inhumane, and machine-like systems (Stinchcombe 1990, Chalofsky 1996). In this paper we argue that the proclivity towards mechanistic management can be traced back to the early part of the twentieth century when researchers began to adopt the natural sciences approach to theorizing about social phenomena. Over the years the erstwhile view of people working together in an organic, living universe that included notions of spirituality, care, and compassion has long since been surpassed by a more mechanistic view of the world. We draw our inspiration from philosophies that venerate a shared humanity, in which the value of compassion features prominently. The argument we make is that restoring this compassion-based ethos in organizations can enlighten the extant management theory and result in more sustainable, humane and caring organizations, based on morally committed instead of merely contracted employees (Etzioni 1988, Frost 1999).

Recently, a number of voices have heralded the coming demise of the social sciences if they continue to fall for the allure of the natural sciences paradigm (Anderson 2000, Ghoshal 2005). Consider, for example, a typical taxonomic representation of the philosophy of science suggested in the literature (Elster 1983, Ghoshal 2005). Such taxonomy delineates two broad categories, namely, the natural sciences on one side and the humanities on the other. Each of these is further subdivided into two broad categories: the natural sciences are subdivided into inorganic matter and organic matter, and the humanities into the social sciences and aesthetic fields. Our focus is the distinction in the philosophical assumptions that undergird the two broad categories. We will use this distinction to demonstrate how, over the years, the social sciences gradually crept toward models that are irrelevant or worse, by imitating the natural sciences. This

is a trend that seems to have begun when organization studies scholars sought to defend the legitimacy of their fields as mature “sciences” on par with the natural sciences. Before long, there was a switch in the labels given to people in the workplace from human ‘beings’ to human ‘resources.’ And the more the ‘resource’ aspects of the human beings were emphasized, the more the ‘human’ in them was marginalized, thereby providing fertile ground for the inhumane management practices that are now prevalent in contemporary organizations (Chakraborty et al. 2004).

More than two decades ago Richard Bettis (1991) lamented the fact that most of the management research was irrelevant to what is going on in large firms, that much of this research seems increasingly and prematurely stuck in a “normal science straightjacket.” Citing Daft and Buenger (1990: 82), he noted, “strategic management has been ensnared by the rituals and paraphernalia of normal science.” Some scholars have recently noted that even though some improvements have been made some elements of the straightjacket still remained, and others added that the extant research in the field of management continues to suffer from the faddishness and mimicry of the natural sciences (Crook et al. 2006; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005; Ghoshal 2006, Hays 2010, Starbuck 2009). Such paraphernalia have blinded social scientists to the significant differences that exist between their fields and those of the natural sciences. We believe that unless the sharply contrasting assumptions of these fields are brought to light, the trend will continue of the social sciences succumbing to the allure of the natural sciences paradigm. The result has been a numbing of sensibilities to human considerations, a universal mistrust, and the downfall and decay of many great organizations. The issue has become more urgent because, unlike the mechanistic individualism of the global West and North the norms that pervade the global East and South are largely based in cultural and social

rationality (Anderson 2000). As increasing globalization continues to bridge the historical East-West, North-South fault lines, social science researchers will be forced to re-think the conceptual foundations of their fields, or at least to have a greater awareness of the institutional contexts in which these concepts are applied.

A new conceptual framework is required to free the social sciences from the normal science straight jacket to which Bettis is referring. We do this by reviewing the modalities, within which social inquiry is constructed, ranging from the ideological, the ontological and epistemological, ultimately to the methodological level. We will begin by distinguishing between the terms ‘science’ and ‘philosophy of science.’

Conceptual Framework

What distinguishes science from philosophy of science? Science is the quest for knowledge understood to be essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment to theory formulation and following established scientific standards and criteria (Kuhn 1970, Popper 1959). An example of such criteria is the notion of falsifiability – the ability of a theory claim to be constantly subjected to systematic attempts to falsify it, rather than verify it – as evidence that the theory is scientific (Popper 1959). It may have been a fascination with Karl Popper’s (1959) classical axiomatic-deductive logic and his logical formalization as a methodology for theory building that stimulated the interests of social scientist researchers in the direction of the positivist natural science paradigm. Philosophy of science on the other hand comprises the conceptual roots undergirding the scientific quest for knowledge (Kuhn 1962, Ponterotto 2005). Incorporated within philosophy of science are beliefs or assumptions regarding axiology, i.e., values that are taken for granted, ideology, ontology, epistemology, and methodology as

discussed below (see also Lincoln & Guba 1985, Ponterotto 2005, 2002). In comparing and contrasting science vs. the philosophy of science, both the hierarchical nature and the paradigmatic assumptions implicit within each must be addressed.

First, on the hierarchical nature a confluence of norms that permeate a community and gain acceptance among increasingly larger and more permanent circles of community are the roots of a culture or ideology. An ideology feeds into the roots of ontological assumptions, which, in turn, inform the epistemological assumptions and eventually the methodology by which knowledge is tested and theories are formulated about the various phenomena. At the same time, researchers must be conscious that approaches to inquiry are located within identifiable research paradigms the most popular dimension of which ranges from the positivistic paradigm of the natural sciences, and to the constructivist paradigm of the social sciences (see Ponterotto 2002). A summary of what each of these modalities of knowledge means and their manifestations within the two research paradigms is presented on Table 1. In the next section we offer a comprehensive discussion of these modalities.

Insert Table 1 about Here

Modalities of Social Enquiry

Developing knowledge about any phenomenon depends on the theoretical examination of the phenomenon at several modalities of knowing. At least four such modalities can generally be identified in the literature, namely, the ideological, ontological, epistemological and methodological levels. At the foundation of all discourse lies ideology, which refers to the shared

framework of mental models about what is believed to be the natural order of the universe. It is a relative set of coherent beliefs that bind people together and explains their worlds to them in terms of cause and effect (Beyer 1981, Trice & Beyer 1984, Denzau & North 2000). The next level is ontology, which is an explicit specification of the conceptualization of a collection of objects, concepts, and other entities that are presumed to exist in some area of interest, and the relationships that hold among them (Genesereth & Nilsson 1987, Gruber 1993). Ontology is a commonly shared understanding of the assumptions regarding the existential nature of given entities or phenomena within a given worldview (Blumer 1977, Oliga 1992a, 1992b, Ponterotto 2002). The names of entities in the discourse within the worldview are ontologically associated with descriptions of their meanings as well as with the formal axioms that circumscribe their interpretations and usage, all of which may vary from one discourse to another (Morgan & Smircich 1980). At the next level is epistemology, which is defined as how we know that what we think exists really exists. Epistemology focuses on the validity of what we claim to be knowledge of a subject matter. At the same time it provides a general intellectual configuration that interrogates the acquisition of knowledge, and the relationships among knowledge itself, the would-be knower (the observer) and his/her social constraints, and the knower (respondent) (Ponerotto 2005). At the last level is methodology, which involves questions about how we measure what we think exists. It prescribes the rules of inquiry – a method for acquiring, defining, classifying, and verifying knowledge. Typical methodologies involve the quantitatively based empiricist ‘scientific method’ of hypothesis testing, experimentation, and observation, and qualitative-based methods, which include the hermeneutics approach that relies on in-depth interviews, understanding, and interpretation, and critique. A schematic representation of these

modalities and their meanings and implications for the natural sciences and the social sciences is presented in Table 1.

Integrating the Modalities

The fundamental premise of our discussion is that an ideological backdrop informs our ontological assumptions about what we believe to exist. As many social science commentators have shown, no consensus actually exists about what is real about social action and what counts as reliable knowledge (Blumer 1977, Oliga 1992a, Wilson 1983). Society, for example, may be defined as an expression of human consciousness, while from another perspective it may be viewed in terms of physical processes and characteristics. It may be seen as an aggregate of individuals drawn together by coercion, or as an organic whole that gives form and content to individuals drawn together by consensus. Another example is the concept of a ‘market’ that may conjure up different understandings to people in socialist, mixed, or capitalist economic systems. Even within the latter, different views may be held about the concept ranging from an inanimate, machine-like entity that follows its own rules and is unaffected by its participants; or a bazaar that is subject to the influences of the interacting participants, albeit sometimes following its own will (Oberlechner et al. 2004).

Diverse ontological assumptions lead to profoundly different epistemological assumptions and methodological prescriptions for the phenomena or concepts under investigation. A constellation of these modalities of knowing provides the intrinsic rationale for individual human agency. But ideology per se does not operationalize the concepts since, even though it may contain beliefs about the natural order of things, the specific form of these beliefs

will tend to be culture-specific (Carter & Jackson 1987: 65). One of the most compelling definitions of culture characterizes it as the “coherent, learned, shared view a group of people has about life’s concerns that ranks what is important, instills attitudes about what things are appropriate, and prescribes [the appropriate] behavior” (Vamer & Beamer 1995: 2). Culture is thus not the result of biological inheritance but learned behavior patterns (Hoebel & Frost 1976), or what Hofstede (1980) describes as the ‘collective programming of the peoples’ minds.’ Note also that, because it is shared in a specific society at a particular point in time, culture is a fluid, ongoing process, continuously subject to construction and reconstruction during interaction between parties (Appadurai 1996, Ralston et al. 1997, Granovetter 1985). It is therefore not static, but susceptible to spatial as well as temporal dynamism. Yet culture still has an obligation to the conventions, social mores, and ‘higher’ values that evolve from the axiological assumptions of ideology (Ravetz 1984, Tinker 1986). This makes the coherence of culture and ideology essential for the maintenance of the social fabric of any community. Individuals do not just passively receive new knowledge; they actively interpret it from their own perspectives and worldviews. They do, however, willfully suspend their disbelief and adapt by accepting new culture in order to survive as they enter new organizations and groups. Even the founders of the philosophy of pragmatism warned that human action cannot be explained solely by ends and beliefs – as if inherent motives and the environment counted for nothing – nor by motives and environment alone – as if ends and beliefs exerted no effect (Dewey 1910/1997, Peirce 1932).

The Human Element in the Social Sciences

As seen in Table 1 above, significant differences exist between the natural sciences and social sciences at each of these modalities. Based on these differences, we submit that it is fallacious

for the social science to abide by the norms of the natural sciences paradigm that precludes any consideration of caring and compassion. We offer exemplary modes of human interactions that are practiced by a large majority of the world population whose fundamental assumption of human nature is that of a caring, compassionate, and relations-driven community, or what some social scientists have called *homo sociologicus* assumptions (Dahrendorf, 1959; Anderson 2000). The clearest example of these philosophies is seen in *Ubuntu*, a sub-Saharan Africa term which goes under different names in other parts of Africa as well as in many parts of the world. Some examples include *ayni*, *sympatia*, and *jeitinho* in Latin America; *wasta* and *ummah* in the Arab world; *inhwa*, *inmak*, *jen* and *li* in Korea; *guanxi* in China; *wa*, *kankei* and *kyosei* in Japan; *amritasya putrah* in India; *blat*, *obschina*, and *sobornost* in Russia; *kaitiakitanga* in New Zealand, and others (Spiller et al. 2011).

 Insert Table 2 about Here

These philosophies offer realities that largely contradicts those professed in the management writings largely influenced by Cartesian thinking, which is predicated on the assumption of humans as rational beings or *homo economicus*. In more recent writings, the *homo economicus* paradigm has come under a fair amount of criticism with emergence of rival models suggesting that humans are that cooperative, altruistic, and fairness-minded. Two of these models are the *homo reciprocans* model (Bowles & 2002, Fehr & Gächter 1998, Fehr et al. 2002) and *homo sociologicus* model (Anderson 2000). Researchers Bowles & Gintis (2002) explain humans' reciprocal nature by observing that people are open to sharing and contributing to their communities, and when they see cooperative behavior, they respond positively. But, at the same

time, if they see someone as acting unfairly or selfishly, they reciprocate by meting out ‘altruistic punishment’ on the free rider to enforce cooperation even if engaging this may be costly to the reciprocator (Fehr et al. 2002). *Homo sociologicus* offers a direct contrast in perception of the human to *homo economicus*. Whereas *economicus* proffers humans as individualistic and motivated by self-interest, *sociologicus* asserts that humans are obligated to fulfill societally predetermined roles and obligations (Anderson 2000). Learning about these expectations and fulfilling them enables people to become part of society and build social relations with others (Boudon 1982, Ng & Tseng 2008). Unfortunately, little research has been done on these paradigms to investigate how differently organizations might be managed under their assumptions. The empirical realities in most emerging market countries offer an opportunity for an alternative paradigm of organization. This is what we refer to as the ‘*homo socio-economicus*’ paradigm, which consists of a healthy balance of both *homo economicus* assumptions on one hand, and *homo sociologicus* and *homo reciprocans* assumptions on the other (O’Boyle 2007). This balanced paradigm provides a better representation of the way people interact in organizations, and thus ensures better, more reliably functioning, and therefore successful, organizations.

But before we get into a discussion of the *homo socio-economicus* paradigm, the next section elaborates on *Ubuntu*, a foundational construct of this paper, as well as similar human philosophies from around the world as noted. In the last section we will develop a model in which the inter-relationships are depicted, and suggest an agenda for future research. We agree with those who state that the persistent Taylorist vision of the employee as a mere factor of production and mechanistic cog in the wheel has now become a liability that must be discarded

as quickly as possible to make room for a humanistic vision, in which the employee is seen as an active and willing participant in the organization (Aktouf, 1992).

The Human Ethos in *Ubuntu* and Its Equivalents around the World

As an ideal, *Ubuntu* has been handed down the generations from the early days of hunting and gathering. Early written accounts about it can be traced as far back as one hundred years to the writings of S.E.K. Mqhayi and other early writers in Southern Africa (Mqhayi 1934, Saule 1991). *Ubuntu* has come to be viewed as an essential frame of reference for understanding African culture in most of sub-Sahara Africa (Karsten & Illa 2005; Luthans et al., 2004). But what in essence is *Ubuntu*? The etymologically accurate derivation of the word *Ubuntu* comes from the prefix *ubu-*, which means ‘being,’ and the root *-ntu* that means ‘human’ (Mfenyana 1986, Pahl & Mesatywa 1970). In simple language, therefore, *Ubuntu* means the state of being human, or humanness. But a more holistic definition would characterize *Ubuntu* as a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that individuals and groups display for one another (Mangaliso 2001: 24). Mnyaka & Motlhabi (2005) characterize *Ubuntu* as an orientation, and a good disposition that motivates, challenges and makes one perceive, feel and act in humane ways toward others. The implications of *Ubuntu* run much deeper. It is a philosophical thought that, while placing humans in the center of the universe, does not make them superior to all things. Ultimately, *Ubuntu* signifies a symbiotic existence between human and human; between human and nature; and between human and the Creator, also known in Southern Africa as *Modimo*, *uNkulunkulu* or *uQamata*. In its ideal form *Ubuntu* is a cultural practice that is an all-encompassing and permeating interaction among people as they go about their everyday lives. To aptly grasp *Ubuntu*, one is exhorted to think of

Clifford Geertz's (1973) work, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, in which he describes culture with all its material and non-material objects, as the web of significance that humans have spun. Accentuated through socialization, *Ubuntu* evokes primordial existential feelings that are used in providing value judgments (Emminghaus, Kimmel & Stewart 1997). Referring to Table 1 above, these sentiments provide the ontological reference points (respect, cooperation, solidarity, empathy, etc.) necessary for creating and maintaining a stable and meaningful identity, which results in peaceful collaboration and coexistence. In most of Africa, as a philosophical thought system, *Ubuntu* and its equivalents have shaped and informed the beliefs, values, and behaviors of a large majority of the continent's almost one billion citizens. Some scholars have noted that variations do exist among different African cultures' interpretations of *Ubuntu* (Lutz 2009). However, many still see *Ubuntu* as the philosophical bedrock used by most African communities to interpret critical issues or to solve vexing problems. *Ubuntu* is invariably invoked as a barometer for good versus bad, right versus wrong, just versus unjust (Mangaliso 2001). Since *Ubuntu* fundamentally addresses issues at the core of human existence and its values seek to nurture, uphold and bring out our best behaviors as human beings, we believe that it is upheld by most human societies around the World as will be show later in this paper.

There has recently been a proliferation of articles in the social sciences that have focused on the essence of *Ubuntu* and how it influences and informs the behavior of humans as they go about their daily lives (Karsten & Illa 2005; Lutz 2009; Mangaliso, 2001; Mbigi & Maree, 1995; Mnyaka & Motlhabi 2005). Some of these articles discuss the tenets of what makes *Ubuntu* unique. The extant literature has presented the characteristics of *Ubuntu* in terms of relationship with others, language and communication, decision-making, time, productivity, age and leadership and belief systems. These were shown to offer ontologically different meanings from

those understood in the West. The same applies to a number of core tenets regarded as most cardinal to *Ubuntu*, including (1) interdependence, reciprocity and solidarity, (2) customs, (3) dialogue and oratory, (4) spiritualism, and (5) ceremonies (Mangaliso 2001; Mangaliso & Mangaliso 2011; Pio et al. 2012, Weir, Mangaliso & Mangaliso, 2010).

Ubuntu is essentialist in the sense that it simply exists as a moral virtue and good. It is emotional and deep, and people simply act in a way they intuitively know to be right. It is not something one chooses—it is accepted as the way life is (Mbigi & Maree 1995). The works of African scholars highlight the philosophical undertones expressed in African language usage mentioned earlier. For example, Gbenda (2008) notes that the issues generated by the concept of ‘*ori*’ or human destiny in the Yoruba metaphysical worldviews suggest that embedded in ordinary common and collective language usage are a number of overarching themes in specific areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. And, making reference to (Hallen 1998), he further notes that utilizing source materials derived primarily from oral literature—proverbs, parables, divination verses, etc.—philosophers, situated for the most part in Africa, set out to analyze the meaning of a concept that occurs in an African language and that they believe to be of philosophical prepossession and interest. But such discursive self-reflection is limited primarily to the indigenous people of Africa.

The various attributes of *Ubuntu* regarded as essential vectors of the philosophy, such as warmth, forgiveness, compassion, respect, dignity of others, empathy, supportiveness, cooperation, understanding, are not regarded as important to the same extent in the Anglo-Saxon World of North America and Western Europe (herein after referred to as simple western¹) where, in fact,

¹We would like to point out that we will refer to 'western values,' or 'core western values' in this paper mindful that these are more appropriately identified as Anglo-Saxon values and perhaps particularly North American values. We

they are discouraged since they are considered to be antithetical to rationality and therefore demonstrate signs of weakness (Seo, Barrett & Bartunek 2004; Putnam & Mumby 1993). This was vividly depicted when, after U.S. House Speaker John Boehner had shed a tear in describing his humble beginnings as a janitor, the news headlines read, “The Crying Shame of John Boehner” (Taibbi 2011), and “John Boehner Cries. Again. A Lot” (Goldman 2010). Business schools have often been criticized for not equipping future managers with the skills needed for success in the workplace including a capacity for compassion and empathy (Benfari & Wilkinson 1988, Cappelli 1992, Livingston 1971, Waddock 2016). But recent scholarly thinking is beginning to turn this around as reflected in the latest calls for research focusing on caring and compassion (Dutton et al. 2006, Frost 1999). These are exemplified in the clarion call from Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton & Margolis (2010: 335) that invited scholars to reflect on how the worlds of management, organizations, and management and organization scholarship might change if themes of compassion and caring were at the forefront of our thinking about organizing. And the call for holistic thought in management training that resides in the intersection of leadership issues with aesthetic ones (Waddock 2016).

There is no question that modern organizations host complex human interactions, the dynamics of which cannot be captured in linear cause-effect Cartesian understanding. Fortunately there is a genre of newly emerging management styles rooted in indigenous traditions that captures these dynamics and has up to this point been mostly neglected. Management based on philosophies such as *Ubuntu* acknowledge that humans are not merely rational beings in the classical economic sense of resource factors for production, but social beings imbued with emotions such as hope, anger, fear, and frustration that must be taken into

are aware of the fact that there are other national or cultural values, notably those embraced within certain continental European countries, which differ significantly from these Anglo-Saxon values.

consideration in everyday interactions (Weir, Mangaliso & Mangaliso 2005). In this worldview, the qualities of caring and compassion mentioned earlier are actually an intrinsic characteristic of all human beings regardless of race or ethnicity. They are potentially wired in the DNA of all humans and are reinforced, realized and actualized in all of us through the process of socialization and nurturing (Gaylard 2004). Using these qualities to establish and maintain relationships takes on special significance when conducting business especially in newly emerging countries (Steenkamp & Hofstede 2002). In many East Asian countries, for example, Confucian philosophy emphasizes the importance of relationships based on the assumption that a human being is not an isolated entity, but exists as part of a larger system of relationships (Hitt, Lee and Yucel 2002). As noted earlier, whether it is *guanxi* in China, *kankei* and *kyosei* in Japan, *kwankye*, *inmak*, *jen* and *li* in Korea, *wasta* in Arab nations, *jeitinho* in Brazil, and *blat* in Russia, or *Ubuntu*, *ujaama* and *harambee* in Sub-Saharan Africa, these relationship-based connections offer a unique kind of competitive advantage to an organization that differs from the alternative that relies largely on economic rationality, mainly dependent on price-quantity considerations. The concept of *inmak* in Korea, which literally refers to people connections, includes whom and how many one knows. It relates to family, educational and/or regional ties, all of which are important and form the basis for doing business in the country. As Steers, Shin and Ungson (1989) have noted, “When Korean managers are introduced, one of their first questions they ask each other concerns where they went to school. Discovering that both attended the same high school or university (even at different times) often brings an instant feeling of closeness” not necessarily based on the prestige of the institution, but rather the connection it affords (cited in Hitt et al. 2002: 358). In many these communities, these

philosophies are reinforced through socialization, established norms and mores, and through daily affirmation.

Within these communities when behaviors occur that are in stark contrast with the espoused ideals, they are met with quick and stern reprobation. Among the Xhosa people in South Africa, for example, when a person displays a pattern of egregious behavior that contradicts the social norms of *Ubuntu*, such as conducting acts of violence or cruelty against another, or displaying a lack of respect for or generosity to others, word will go out that ‘so and so’ is not a person – *akangomntu* – the most ignominious characterization that can be bestowed on anyone. It means that his/her behaviors have made this transgressor of social mores lower than a human being – indeed, a beast. On a larger scale, the acts of xenophobia in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda and Congo, and ethnic cleansing elsewhere (Bosnia-Herzegovina) are examples of behaviors that flaunt the principles of humaneness discussed in *Ubuntu*. These behaviors and other acts of repression and brutality represent aberrations from societal norms and receive strong condemnation from community leaders and public figures (Hadland, 2008).

Homo economicus versus Homo sociologicus

Several critical conceptual differences exist between the rationally based view of transactions and the relations based view even though each view presents a coherent and internally consistent paradigm of explaining the transactions (Kuhn 1970, Pfeffer 1993). At first glance, the existence of multiple paradigms is an encouraging sign since this not only contributes to the theoretical development of any field of scientific enquiry, but it is a necessary condition for the advancement of knowledge (Kuhn 1970, Cannella & Paetzold 1994). In trying to reach consensus, however, researchers have up to now tended to pit these two paradigms against each

other as if they were polar opposites. We believe that a higher level of predictability of transaction choices would be reached if the two paradigms were to be viewed as complementary to, rather than competing against, each other (Kuhn 1970, Weick 1979) much in the same way as the relation between Newtonian and Einsteinian paradigms in physics. Newtonian physics holds true at relatively low speeds where the mass of an object remains constant. At much higher speeds the Einsteinian paradigm gives a higher level of prediction since that fact that mass is no longer constant invalidates Newton's formulas. We proffer that a similar complementarity exists in the social sciences. For example, for transactions that take place within some limited frame of reference (industry, geographic borders, or cultural group), predictions from the western-based positivist logic as exemplified in the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory, may be acceptable and valid. Overall, efficiency and productivity should be subordinate to humanity. In some specific cases, the choice of whether to conduct transactions internally or to contract them externally in the marketplace can be correctly guided by the TCE paradigm. However, in transactions taking place across frames of reference, the choice between whether to contract in the open marketplace or to internalize operations within the firm can no longer be that simple. We believe that divergent values across reference frames will tend to undermine the predictive validity of neoclassical economics, yielding to a new paradigm that incorporates issues not considered in that frame of reference. The most notable of these are the issues of community and trust that have been mentioned in the literature (Adler 2001, Ouchi 1981) and are essential elements of the *Ubuntu* philosophy.

As noted above, little research has been conducted on the *homo sociologicus* paradigm of the social sciences and consequently it has remained unclear and less well understood. In this section we define and discuss the underpinnings and assumptions of the *homo sociologicus*

paradigm, compare and contrast it with those of the *homo economicus* paradigm, and conclude that a healthy combination of the two paradigms will go a long way toward insuring better understanding of the functioning of organizations (Anderson, 2000). In the next paragraph we discuss the evolution of the *homo sociologicus* paradigm.

The term *homo sociologicus* was first introduced by German Sociologist Emile Durkheim (1958). Central to this paradigm is the assumption that human behavior is a complex phenomenon guided not just by rationality but also by feelings and emotions which play a key role in the way humans interact and form bonds (George 2000, Goleman 1995, Jones & George 1998). Human behavior is also guided by ethical accountability and other externally based influences such as organizational rules and standards, and societal norms and cultural sanctions. In Durkheim's (1958) ontological perspective, humans exist as an organic, holistic, morally based community in which social interactions and norms have a central effect on the decisions, choices and actions of the individual, who is seen as being inextricably related to the other members within that society. As one of the founders of the field of sociology, Durkheim was a proponent of methodological holism, which approached research questions from this worldview of constant social interaction. Although Elster (1989: 100-101) agrees with the social interaction effects on individuals, he does not ascribe to the centrality of morality in defining social norms, which to him include "consumption norms" or manners, norms that reject unnatural acts, work-related norms, and norms that involve "reciprocity," "retribution," "cooperation," and "distribution." Anderson (2000: 170-171) defines a social norm as "a standard of behavior shared by a social group, commonly understood by its members as authoritative or obligatory for them" and characterizes the obligatory realization "the normativity of the norm." Other characteristics of social norms are defined in terms of the consequences to the individual held

accountable by the group for not obeying, e.g., exclusion from the group or some other form of retributory or sanction (Anderson, 2000).

While it does not entirely disavow the existence of self-interest in humans, the *homo sociologicus* paradigm suggests that it is only one possibility of an array of motivations that humans experience. Altruism, based on love of others or sense of duty, or negative self-centered motives of shame or guilt or positive ones of achievement without reward, or even hate, can make individuals choose other than the maximum utility function associated with pure self interest. From the worldview of *Ubuntu*, the paradigm is morally grounded and motivations are based on selfless disposition toward others, on caring and compassion toward fellow humans, and on treating others with respect as ends and not instruments for reaching the ends of others.

Rationality vs. Humanity

One way to view *homo sociological* is to understand what it is not; i.e., *homo economicus*. *Homo sociologicus* rejects the criticality of rationalism and utilitarian individualism—the core assumptions of *homo economicus*. Western organizational scholars and practitioners, having embraced the *homo economicus* paradigm, take an exact opposite perspective from that of the compassion-based management style represented in *Ubuntu* and similar philosophies. The dominant logic in western management theory and practice is based on calculative, instrumentalist objectives, with control being the prime consideration (Etzioni 1988). The logic comes from early theories proposed by scholars who held strong ideological convictions about the merits of individualism. It therefore left no room for the examination of the alternative *homo-sociologicus* paradigm, as discussed above, that focuses on community as an essential component of humanism manifested in *Ubuntu*. The humanism in *Ubuntu* shows a sharp

departure from the thinking portrayed in some of Adam Smith's (1776/1999) metaphors, among these being that our dinner comes not from the benevolence of the butcher and baker but from a strong regard to their own self-interest, and that dependence on such benevolence is a choice only made by beggars. These metaphors seem to suggest that humans are self-serving, opportunistic beings, quite the opposite of *Ubuntu* thought and philosophy.

The *homo economicus* paradigm conceptualizes the individual worker as a factor of production. The core assumptions of *homo economicus*, rationality and maximizing of self-interest have evolved over the years from John Stuart Mill's (1843) theory of utilitarianism. The theory holds that humans determine the moral worth of an action from its utility in providing happiness or pleasure, and make judgments solely based on their own subjectively defined ends (Mill 1843). The human species is assumed to be eudaemonistic and hedonistic with the realization of one's true potential being the highest of all human values (Haybron 2008, Parkan 2007). In accordance with Aristotelian thinking, the highest of all human values is the realization of one's true potential (Ryff & Singer 1998). An entire lexicon of the extant management vocabulary has been spawned by Mill's positivistic influences. A few examples include decision theory, game theory, and agency theory, all of which are concerned with identifying the values, uncertainties and scenarios relevant in a given decision, its rationality, and the resulting choice of the optimal decision. In short, the basis of all decisions is the practicality and instrumentality of the choices made (Vroom 1964). However, it is here that this rationale is often found to be at odds with reality in many situations, especially in the context of emerging market nations, and therefore leads to a discrediting of the assumption of humans as solely *homo economicus* beings.

For instance, the notion of bounded rationality suggests that an individual cannot possess the capacity to process every piece of available information exhaustively and completely (Simon

1958). The limited cognitive capacity to process information often forces an individual to *satisfice*, i.e., to make decisions with limited information – decisions that could be reversed if sufficient information processing capacity, more information, or if more time were available. Sometimes people are also disposed to act in ways that are contrary to rational reasoning, e.g., when they endanger their lives for the sake of helping others, and when they engage in acts of volunteerism and charity. But more importantly the *homo economicus* assumptions disregard a key aspect of human nature inherent within the human species. That is humans' desire to connect to one another and to develop deeper emotional ties that create the essence of community. In many ways, experiments grounded in the theory of *homo economicus* and utility maximization have not done much to advance the field (Anderson 2000). Our inability to accurately assess probabilities and risks and to evaluate our preference function, our inability to make rational decisions based on pure logic and devoid of all emotion other than personal utility maximization, challenges the very foundational assumptions underlying the *homo economicus* model of human behavior and decision-making. These flaws notwithstanding, the *homo economicus* assumption has continued to dominate theory development in the management sciences leading to the observation that, "there is probably no other hypothesis about human behavior so thoroughly discredited on empirical grounds that still operates as a standard working assumption in any discipline" (Anderson 2000: 173). Even the recent attention paid to the deviations to rationality in behavioral economics has been limited to "foolishness" and not to any aspect of other-than-self-interested preferences of individuals (Ghoshal 2005: 82). Blind application of the *homo economicus* assumptions has inevitably lead to the implementation of policies that are exploitative and tragically inappropriate, and this is probably the reason why many theorists have cast doubt about the ability to explain most social phenomena solely on its

assumptions unless they are supplemented with more socially sophisticated elements, such as social and ethical values, altruism, and desires for social status, which are fundamental in the HS paradigm (Anderson 2000, Ben-Ner & Putterman 1998, Mahoney & McGahan 2007).

Toward an Integrative Paradigm: *Homo Socio-Economicus*

This leads to the larger discussion of what the true motivator behind human behavior is – logic or emotion, a debate not easily settled. Indeed, it can be acknowledged that humans are motivated by both logic and emotion, signaling a need for designs of synthesis between these motivators to allow for greater growth and achievement for the individual and the group, advancing the aforementioned interconnectedness, an essential and natural part of humanity. For instance agency theory explains that individuals will maximize their own utility to the extent permitted by the constraints imposed on them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Control theory states that individuals are rewarded or sanctioned according to how they perform relative to established standards, and thus, behavior results from control mechanisms, including accountability (Tannenbaum 1968). Recognizing that there are as many dangers in embracing too strongly the doctrine of human nature as there are in denying it, many notable researchers have begun to advocate for the incorporation of *Ubuntu*-like conceptions of organizations. For example, the fusion metaphor has been used for a style of managing and leading characterized as achieving a sense of unity, coming to see others as part of the same whole, seeing similarities rather than differences, common ground and a sense of community based on what people share – vision, norms, and outcomes (Daft & Lengel 2000, Marcic 1997). In a sense, fusion implies combining holistically the different ways of knowing to create an integrated knowledge frame of reference that recognizes the need for productivity and efficiency within a humane and caring context. This

is not an easy task but neither is the notion of fusion from a classical metaphysical perspective (Pepper 1953).

Elster (1989) compares and contrasts the two paradigms of rationality, *homo economicus*, and humanity or *homo sociologicus*, and introduces an “eclectic view” on why a synthesis of the two, which we have called *homo socio-economicus*, may be more appropriate. Decisions are situation dependent and may sometimes depend on rationality, sometimes on social norms, or sometimes a combination of the two; e.g., when rational arguments are tempered by moral or normative imperatives. While norms tend to be unconditional, and atemporal, rationality is future oriented and much more flexible regarding response to change, suggesting that a compromise might be prudent when dramatic changes in circumstances require a more immediate and dynamic strategic response than could be afforded under strict adherence to norms. Cost-benefit analysis can be used as a guide to decide to what extent norms can/should be modified without sacrificing the core underlying values they represent. In our emphasis of moral-based norms of *Ubuntu* the normativity of the norms is high and therefore the flexibility to deviate from those norms is less than it would be with some of Elster’s less moral-based social norms. However, we do believe that the *homo socio-economicus* paradigm promises significant implications for both theory and practice regarding the use of a caring and compassionate organizational environment to further the goal of sustainable competitive advantage.

Insert Table 3 about Here

Implications of the *Homo Socio-Economicus* Paradigm

As described in earlier sections, there are flaws in both *Ubuntu* with its seemingly idiosyncratic practices and groupthink and western management practices founded under *homo economicus*

assumptions with their lack social interconnectedness. What is compelling about understanding both is identifying that these systems would function more broadly and holistically if they were to borrow aspects of the other's strengths for their own areas of weakness. We are not prescribing that all traditional western management principles be replaced with those of *Ubuntu*, but rather are suggesting integration between the two philosophies that amalgamates the best from both. Fundamentally, most of the core concepts of western culture are embedded in the historically entrenched Taylorist values with regard to utility-based decision-making and individualism (Taylor 1911/1947). Nevertheless, the world is globalizing and becoming increasingly diverse. But now, with the forces of globalization operating at accelerating rates, new ways of working together and finding common ground must be sought out and implemented. *Ubuntu* provides an opportunity, a way to that common ground – it is the conduit for our common humanity. It is apparent that the shortcomings of western management and leadership in regard to the development and manifestation of strong communities and organizations would be well served and fortified by assimilating many of the core components of *Ubuntu*. As supporters of the advocates of the humanistic approach to managing, we concur it is the best foundation upon which to build a work environment that fosters creativity and productivity through the willing participation of all parties concerned in the common endeavor (Aktouf 1992).

Insert Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 summarizes the underlying perspectives of the two paradigms, *homo economicus* and *homo sociologicus* and how the hybrid paradigm, which we call *homo socio-economicus*, is

nested between the two in such a way as to evolve a more holistic manner by which organizations can function in the globalized world.

Homo Economicus. The *homo economicus* paradigm - represented by boxes 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 1 - assumes a natural explanation for all human behavior and sees the system mechanistically in terms of a set of interacting stable, determinate forces (Ayer 1973, Comte 1853). In this paradigm the underlying ideology is based on the belief in the self-interested asocial and atomistic individual, whose decision-making is driven by instrumental rationality and conditioned by future outcomes. The ontology is instrumentalist, i.e., people are seen means to accomplishing organizational ends and reality is assumed to be objectifiable. Epistemologically the paradigm relies on empirical evidence as proof of existence: the only things that exist are those that can be measured in a detached. The etic perspective supersedes the emic perspective. Humans are seen as resources and input factors into the system, that must be controlled through predetermined terms and conditions of employment reached through contractual bargaining processes. The methodology for measuring the resources is established logically, systematically and quantitatively. This applies to a whole range of contexts, including accurately recorded job descriptions, properly calibrated performance standards, and wages and rewards determined by formula, e.g., the ratio of inputs to outputs. The ultimate priority is to fulfill the utilitarian goals of cost minimization and profit maximization. Under this paradigm, as discussed below, layoffs are easily justified under the guise of cost cutting in order to increase shareholder value even though evidence seems to contradict this claim (see Cascio 1993, Lee 1997).

Homo Sociologicus. The *homo sociologicus* paradigm - represented by boxes 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 1 - is based on the underlying ideology of the human concerned with the well being of others, governed by prescribed norms of conduct and subjected to codes of moral obligations.

Ontologically, reality in this paradigm is holistic and seen as socially constructed and anchored on the belief that people are to be treated as ends, not means. Epistemology consists of learning to learn, with most knowledge being contextualized experiential in the ‘emic’ sense, with the manager playing the role of facilitator and nurturer of talent to inspire creativity and innovativeness, in a trusting and open work environment, and respect of the work-life balance and democratic values. The methodologies followed in this paradigm tend to be steeped in hermeneutics, with decisions reached in a non-hierarchical manner, mostly through group discussion and consensus, and the greatest commitment being to people development.

Homo Socio-Economicus. The *homo socio-economicus* paradigm, represented by box 9 in Figure 1, is situated in the middle of the two paradigms above, representing the best characteristic from both. As noted earlier, the *homo economicus* goals of productivity and efficiency are accomplished within a humane atmosphere based on genuine compassion and care. Whereas under *homo sociologicus* transformational leadership trumps the strictly transactional leadership that pervades *homo economicus* philosophy, *homo socio-economicus* leadership goes a step further by also incorporating the characteristics of transcendental leadership (Gardiner 2006, Sanders et al. 2003). It acknowledges that humans are mind, body and spirit, which is precisely what *Ubuntu* and several of the cultures noted above embody. Whereas *homo sociologicus* shows a concern for, and involvement in, the other’s well being, *homo socio-economicus* exhibits a deep commitment to it. The well-known chicken and pig anecdote captures the essence conveyed here: in the bacon and egg breakfast the chicken’s involved but the pig is committed. Altruism also pervades motivation in an interesting way since, as some have noted, ‘altruism may be the highest form of self-interest’ (Tutu 1999). The ethos represented in the *homo socio-economicus* paradigm provides hope for the stakeholders in

contemporary organizations in that it embraces the positive aspects of both rationality and humanity in Figure 1 above. Researchers who recognize the possibility of both rational, internally focused and altruistic, externally focused decision-making paradigm hybrids can help advance the field of organization studies in a more relevant way at a time when the globalization of organizations and the lack of trust in organizational leadership present ethical challenges beyond the mere profit maximization objective.

The implications for research are based on the introduction of a new lens through which the organizational studies scholar can explore more complex, and relevant, phenomena than might be available under the current paradigms. Sustainable competitive advantage can be interpreted by researchers through the lens of humanity, which can explore the possibilities of leveraging that human approach to achieve organizational excellence cross-culturally. Potential research questions include, “How are character, commitment and cooperation impacted by an underlying culture fashioned after *Ubuntu*, and how can those ideals lead to a sustainable competitive advantage? How is our conception consensus decision-making, agency theory, the resource-based view of the organization, etc., altered in the context of *Ubuntu*? How are the dominant norms to be established within the organization? Should it be the grassroots bottom-up, or executive driven top-down movement? What are the organizational structural implications of the paradigm?

While the focus of the present paper has largely been on the conceptual level, practitioners will also benefit from a widened perspective. The dominant organizational paradigm based on *homo economicus* alone, informed by the proud individualism embraced by many Western societies may be inappropriate not only for the more “connected” emerging nations of the East and South, but may also have worn out their welcome in a weary West. The

practical implications of changing to the new paradigm are complex. Managers are used to reaching economic goals through economic means. Rewards and punishments are primarily economic in nature. Bonuses and pay increases are the foundation of the merit system. Whistle blowers, according to current thinking, must be paid to report transgressions within the company. But economic compensation alone does not always make the best motivator. In the worst-case scenario, as the classic experiment by Deci (1971) found, compensation can actually discourage commitment. Pride in achievement often outweighs the value of a compensatory reward. Indeed, committed groups might look at the latter in disdain, cheapening their commitment to a cause or project. But the hybrid, *socio-economicus*, paradigm suggested in this paper does admit to the existence of the rational, self-interested side of humans. Will groups within the organization monitor and sanction activities, as appropriate among themselves? What are the performance implications of decision-making processes, both strategic and tactical, that are based on consensus? What type of manager is required to lead such a group to maintain, and leverage, these new levels of commitment, character and cooperation?

Internally, an organization that recognizes the *homo sociologicus*, tempered, but not dictated, by economic assumptions of *homo economicus*, should be able to maintain a stable, productive, cooperative and trusting workforce – an anomaly in today’s marketplace. The strategy of downsizing is a perfect manifestation of *homo economicus*-based thinking gone awry. Downsizing, often multiple times, has been undertaken historically as a strategy to increase Return on Investment (ROI). Senior management is often rewarded on ROI, in which the numerator represents net income and the denominator, investment in assets or people. To make the number larger (and increase their bonuses), managers can either increase the numerator or decrease the denominator – a practice known as *denominator* management (Hamel & Prahalad

1994). It is easier, and faster, to cut costs than to come up with revenue creating ideas. Consequently, individuals or entire divisions are laid off, often in multiple rounds. Self-interest has backfired, for in following their own short-term interests of bonus maximization, management has failed to recognize the long-term consequences of their actions (Appelbaum & Lavigne-Schmidt 1999, Mangaliso & Halvorsen 1995,1996, Nixon et al. 2004, O'Neill & Lenn 1995). The workers, considered as “factors of production”, who have survived initial layoffs, are demoralized for a number of possible reasons. They are compelled to take on extra responsibilities at no more pay to make up for the lost employees. After being assured there would be no more layoffs, additional rounds of layoffs often occur, instilling distrust in those still around. Management is frequently seen as unfair or unprofessional in the way they handle the layoffs, further instilling distrust or disrespect among the survivors. All in all, employees lose trust, enthusiasm and any sense of commitment. Those who can will, in self-interest, look elsewhere before the next layoff hits them. And the self-interest of competitor companies will mean that they will pick and choose the best of the available labor pool, which means our original corporation may lose its best talent, and, hence, its position in the market place, and once again may face another round of layoffs. In current economic times where alternative jobs are not readily available, the negative organizational implications may not be as evident or immediate, but they still exist in terms of current employee morale and distrust, and long-term consequences on productivity and profitability. .

Consumers, investors and other external stakeholders would also benefit from a more humanistic corporate culture. In the days of Adam Smith, the carpenter who crafted a shoddy bookcase for a local customer was soon without customers, so it was in his self-interest to build the best bookcase he could, at the lowest price, and still make a decent profit. In a global

economy where complex products are built (e.g., consumer electronics) or devised (e.g., financial derivatives), and customer and provider may literally be a world apart, it would be naïve to assume that the customer has all the information necessary to make a rational decision or that the provider will, out of self interest, deliver the best service/product economically feasible. Ironically, the worker in his or her role as consumer or investor has been an enabler in the decline of the corporate culture in the West. The emphasis on quantity, not quality, by consumers demanding cheap goods, and the greed of investors chasing either foolish or illegal investments, makes them in some way co-conspirators of the *homo economicus* debacle.

It is fitting to conclude with the words of Edward J. O'Boyle's (2007:321) who noted that, "Burying homo economicus and substituting homo socio-economicus brings the basic unit of economic analysis out of the individualism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into the personalism of the twentieth century." And, as Aktouf (1992) has observed, Taylorist vision of the employee as a cost factor and as a passive cog has now become a liability that must be discarded as quickly as possible to make room for a humanistic vision, whereby the employee is seen as an active and willing participant in the organization. To that we would add the humanism needed in the twenty-first century since,

Table 1: Comparison of Social Inquiry Modalities

MODALITY	HOW DEFINED	NATURAL SCIENCES, e.g., Physics, Biology	SOCIAL SCIENCES, e.g., Philosophy, Sociology
Ideology	Shared framework of mental models about what we believe to be the natural order of the universe, i.e., the way the environment is structured (Denzau & North 2000).	Einsteinian Big Bang theory in Physics Darwinian Evolutionary Biology Contains beliefs about a natural order or hierarchy of knowledge from single cell organisms to physical or physiological objects or bodies	Laws are not reified (Tinker 1986). Individuals construct mental models to make sense out of the world around them. Belief that convergent mental models evolve among individuals with common experiences and that divergent models among individuals with different backgrounds
Ontology	What reality is made of, i.e., actual and objective structures (realist view), or symbolic and socially constructed subjective processes (nominalist view).	Realist view Objectivity with reduced subjectivity Humans perceived as passive receptor of discrete, atomic impressions from the outside	Nominalist view based on the philosophy of the rejection of universalism Questions the possibility of a mind-independent world External world is a social construction of human perception (Berger & Luckmann 1966)
Epistemology	How we know that what we think exists, really exists. It interrogates relationships among knowledge, observer, and social constraints on the observer.	Positivistic Descriptive epistemology reduced to methodology Critique exists only in immediate scientific community	Relativistic Descriptive epistemology not subordinate to methodology Introspective critique exists
Methodology	How we measure what we think exists. Prescribes the rules of inquiry – a method for acquiring, defining, classifying, and verifying knowledge.	Nomothetic, etic - relating to the discovery of universal laws. Epistemic nature of method not critiqued Subjective ontology denied	Idiographic, emic - concentrating on specific cases and distinctiveness of individuals or groups Linkages between subjective and objective ontology recognized.

Table 2: Philosophies of Caring and Compassion from Around the World

TERM Region	MEANING	REFERENCES
<i>Ubuntu</i> Africa	Predicated on the belief that each person is endowed with dignity, integrity and value that must be acknowledged respected and valued. Ubuntu is a pervasive inner spirit that predisposes one to feeling and acting in humane ways toward others. It is characterized by a spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that people have for one another.	Mangaliso 2001, Mfenyana 1986, Mnyaka & Motlhabi 2005
<i>Ujaama, Harambe</i> Africa	<i>Ujaama</i> is based on the African value system that supports the belief that improving the living conditions for all is a necessary precondition for individual satisfaction. It involves sharing and working together in unity (<i>harambee</i>), in a way that is quite different that is understood under Western socialism or communalism.	Kisubi 2012, Mazrui & Zirimu 1990, Nyerere 1967
<i>Ayni</i> Latin America	The norm of reciprocity that governs relationships among the Quechua people in the valleys of the Andes Mountains of South America. It has helped in sustaining them over long periods of time.	Porter & Monard 2001, Incayawar 2008
<i>Jeitinho</i> Latin America	A Brazilian way, manner, tact, appearance, adroitness, aptitude, dexterity of finding solutions to problems in a cordial way that seeks intimacy and avoids confrontation even in the workplace.	Garibaldi de Hilal 2006, Duarte 2006, Neves Barbosa 1995
<i>Simpatia</i> Latin America	Social behaviors that emphasize empathy, respect and harmony, and a greater sense of connectedness. The behaviors also serve to protect human dignity by avoiding the unpleasantness of conflicts and awkward situations and evolving a quality of <i>personalismo</i> —individualized and personalized attention in business transactions.	Triandis et al. 1984, Osland et al. 1999
<i>Wasta</i> Middle-East North Africa	<i>Wasta</i> underlies and integrates three dimensions: the central significance of social networks, the global philosophy of Islam as based on expectations about the good practice of Islam; and the model of the family as the universal matrix of social order.	Hitchings & Weir 2006, Haoxiang 2006, Cunningham & Sarayrah 1993
<i>Ummah</i> Middle-East North Africa	Etymologically, the term means a ‘community’ or ‘nation’ with the understanding that it contains a religious dimension at its center. In the Muslim context it means a community of believers that represents the totality of those who accept the principles of Islam and to whom therefore this regulation applies.	Weir et al. 2010, Denny 1975
<i>Wa</i> Japan	Signifies the importance of group loyalty, social cohesion, and consensus	Alston 1989, Wierzbicka 1991
<i>Kankei</i> Japan	Reflects the subconscious notion of granting access through relationship, based upon proven loyalty to the larger social arrangement.	Abe 1997, Kim & Nofsinger 2005, Wu & Xu 2005
<i>Kyosei</i> Japan	The spirit of cooperation through which different stakeholders establish a harmonious relationship among one another and with the environment.	Kaku 1997
<i>Guanxi</i> China	Refers to the establishment of a connection between independent parties that enables a mutually beneficial flow of personal, business or social transactions. However, both parties must derive benefits from the transaction to ensure the continuation of such a relationship.	Arias 1998, Hong & Engestrom 2004, Cheng et al. 2004, Leung & Tung 1996
<i>Inhwa</i> Korea	Defined as harmony with the organization in the subordinate-superior relationship. Among other things, it dictates that subordinates be loyal to their superiors and that superiors look out for the well being of their subordinates.	Alston 1989
<i>Inmak</i> Korea	Literally refers to people connections, includes whom and how many one knows. It relates to family, educational and/or regional ties, all of which are important and form	Steers, et al. 1989

	the basis for doing business in the country	
<i>Jen, Li</i> Korea	<i>Jen</i> refers not only to relationships formed between two people but also more broadly to the general warmth, courtesy, respect, and deference humans feel towards other people. <i>Li</i> means propriety or etiquette.	Yum 2007, Lew 1970
<i>Blat</i> Russia	A relational system that requires that people rely upon one another to get things done (Russia).	Batjargal 2003, Ledeneva 1998
<i>Sobornost</i> Russia	Organic equilibrium of personality and society encompassing ideas of free unity, spirituality and harmony most observable in the Russian rural communes (Russia).	Ledeneva 1998
<i>Obschina</i> Russia	Covenant-style institutions of economic life based on harmonious social organization and common use of land that precludes both extreme individualism and its restraint by coercion.	Ledeneva 1998
<i>Kaitiakitanga</i> New Zealand	A Maori philosophy that emphasizes that from birth humans are imbued with spiritual power or <i>mana</i> that simultaneously obliges and empowers them to care, respect, conserve, and create conscious well-being or <i>mauri ora</i> for other humans and the ecosystem.	Spiller, et al. 2011


Table 3: Comparison of *Homo Economicus* and *Homo Sociologicus*

(Adapted from Elster 1989)

	<i>Homo Economicus</i>	<i>Homo Sociologicus</i>	<i>Homo Socio-Economicus</i>
Authors	Adam Smith (1776) Milton Friedman (1970)	Emile Durkheim (1958) Berger & Luckman (1966)	
Assumptions about human nature	Self-interested individual	Individual in relationship with others, interested in common well-being and values	Humans exhibit both attributes and will tap on either depending on the situation
Guide for action	Instrumental rationality	Social norms	A combination of the two
Attraction	Drawn by future rewards	Driven by social forces	Rewards guided by norms
Adaptability	Influenced by changing circumstances	Prescribed norms used to inform behavior in various circumstances	Circumstances and behaviors interweave to influence action
Orientation	Conditioned on outcomes, future-oriented	Unconditional, not future-oriented	Future orientation tampered by social norms
Caricature	Self-contained, asocial, atomistic	Mindless plaything of social forces	Vacillates between the two

Figure 1: Humanistic and Scientific Views of Organization

[Layout adapted from Jackson 2002: 457]



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